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RULE 10b-5 AND "FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET"-HEAVY SEAS MEET TRANQUIL SHORES
ROBERT N. RAPP*
Fraud is infinite, and were a Court of Equity once to lay down
rules, how far they would go, and no further, in extending their
relief against it, or to define strictly the species or evidence of it,
the jurisdiction would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by
new schemes which the fertility of man's invention would contrive.1
[T]he central purpose of the acts is the protection of investors . .. and the promotion of free and honest securities
markets ....The acts reach complex fraudulent schemes as well
as lesser misrepresentations or omissions. Full disclosure is only
one means, albeit a central one, of achieving these paramount
goals.2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Lord Hardwicke's missive discloses the spark of dynamism which
has guided the evolution of the body of law that today surrounds Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and SEC Rule 10b-5.' That
the section and the rule prohibit "fraud" in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security, and that the proscriptions "must be read flexibly,
not technically and restrictively,"5 is the stuff on which practitioners in
the area have long been weaned. Yet post-1975 attention of the United
States Supreme Court to matters of securities law which formed the
heart and soul of an expansionist era has brought retrenchment and
sober reconsideration of the proper role and scope of securities law protections. This is particularly true as to assertion of implied private
remedies," and it is against that backdrop that the 1981 decisions in
* A.B. 1969, Case Western Reserve University; J.D. 1972, Case Western Reserve
University. The author is a partner in Calfee, Halter & Griswold, Cleveland, Ohio, and is a
lecturer in law (Securities Regulation) at the Cleveland Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University. He is a member of the Ohio and Federal Bars.
I Letter of Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kames (1785), quoted in SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
1 Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
Supt. of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971).
6 See Marine Bank v. Weaver, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,481, at 92,764 (1982) (certificate of deposit issued by federally regulated bank not a
"security" within the purview of the federal securities laws); Aaron v. Securities and Ex-
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Shores v. Sklar,7 and Panzirerv. Wolf,8 by the Fifth and Second Circuits
respectively, along with Abrams v. Johns-Manville Corp.9 in the
Southern District of New York, stand spotlighted in their proposition of
securities law antifraud liability based upon so-called integrity of the
market.
Of critical concern, of course, is the absence in this approach to
"fraud" of any direct causal connection between any allegedly deficient
disclosure and the subject transaction. Shores thus upheld the assertion
of antifraud claims based upon the fraudulent presence of securities in a
market without regard for the failure of the plaintiff to read any
change Commission, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (SEC must prove scienter as an element of a civil
enforcement action for violations of § 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of
1933); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (silence, absent a duty to disclose, will not
give rise to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979) (refusal to imply any private right of action under § 206 of Investment Advisers Act); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (Securities Exchange
Act § 28 intended to protect rather than limit state authority with regard to corporate and
securities transactions); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (refusal to imply any private damage remedy under § 17(a), Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Burks v.
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (state law governs corporate directors' power to terminate
derivative litigation); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979)
(interest in an involuntary, non-contributory pension plan not security within the purview of
federal securities laws); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978)
(SEC statutory power to summarily impose ten-day trading suspension strictly construed to
preclude series of summary suspensions based on single set of circumstances); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (only conduct involving manipulation or deception
within the scope of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977)
(refusal to imply any private right of action under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 on behalf of an unsuccessful tender offeror); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426
U.S. 148 (1976) (restrictive approach to proper venue for suits against a national bank under
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)
(pronouncement of a materiality standard recognizing that "[s]ome information is of such
dubious signficance that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good");
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienteran element of private action for
damages under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975)
(traditional requirements, including that of irreparable harm, apply to claims for injunctive
relief for violation of § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (standing to assert § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims limited to
actual purchasers or sellers); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975) (shares of "stock" in state-sponsored housing cooperative not securities within the
purview of federal securities laws); but see Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981)
("preponderance of evidence" standard appropriate in SEC administrative proceedings
rather than more restrictive "clear and convincing" standard); Rubin v. United States, 449
U.S. 424 (1981) (pledge of stock as collateral for bank loan constitutes "offer or sale" within
purview of § 17(a) of Securities Act of 1933); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979)
(protection of § 17(a) of Securities Act of 1933 extends beyond actual purchasers and investors to cover those involved in after-market trading frauds).
647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), petitionfor cert. pending, No. 81-839.
663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsub nom. Price Waterhouse & Co. v. Panzirer, No. 81-1998.
1 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,348, at 92,156 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
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disclosure documents. Applying a "chain of causation" analysis, Panzirer
likewise looked to the "integrity of the market" to uphold the statement
of claim based upon deficient disclosure in documents the plaintiff never
saw, but which allegedly resulted in favorable media commentary.
No doubt mindful of an earlier reflection that the area of securities
law liability analysis is one in which "glib generalization and unthinking
abstractions are major occupational hazzards",' ° the Supreme Court, in
its post-1975 securities law decisions, has taught that careful attention to
the statutes and their desired purpose is a virtue to be practiced with
solemn dedication." In particular, the Court cautioned that the language
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 establishes the outer limits of its own
sphere of operation. Courts may not properly "add a gloss to the
operative language of the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning."' 2 That admonition in Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green
came in reaction to an attempt to extend the notions of "fraud" or
"manipulation" within the ambit of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to unfairness or breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities
transaction. The Santa Fe Industries Court soundly rejected this attempt upon the recognition, among others, that the Supreme Court
"repeatedly has described the 'fundamental purpose' of the Act as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure;' once full and fair disclosure
has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a
tangential concern of the statute.""
Though not entirely without tension among the circuits and occasional expansively imaginative interpretations, the post-1975 decisions
of the high Court addressing the scope and breadth of the federal
securities laws, particularly the antifraud provisions, have dominated
throughout the judiciary. On fundamental questions of standing,
materiality, and the very notion of "fraud", the appellate courts have
carried the tenets of the Supreme Court decisions into varied applications. Moreover, the sense of the post-1975 positions of the Court has
manifested itself in important considerations of other fundamental principles attendant to antifraud claims.'4
SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), in which the
Court in considering the issue of standing to assert a private right of action under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 cautioned that expansive interpretations and applications must be consistent
with policy considerations underlying the legislative scheme. See 421 U.S. at 737.
2 Santa Fe. Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977).
"SA
1 at 477-78.
11For example, paying particular heed to Justice Rhenquist's admonition in Blue Chip
Stamps that in deciding questions concerning the scope of civil actions under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 "policy considerations" should be taken into account, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals opined in Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977), that the causation element of antifraud liability requires a direct causal relationship, tantamount to privity, between open market buyers and sellers of a security in order
for there to be recovery under Rule 10b-5 for trading on "inside" information.
"
"
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In decisions since Santa Fe Industries, Ind. v. Green 5 the lower
courts confronting antifraud allegations in so-called corporate "fairness"
transactions, particularly those courts embracing the recalcitrant postSanta Fe interpretation of the Second Circuit in Goldberg v. Merridor"
have demonstrated careful adherence to the fundamental proposition
that Section 10(b) and Rule-10b-5 address deception in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security.' 7
The Supreme Court's post-1975 limitations on the scope of private
actions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 come in conjunction with its
reference to the "modest aims and origins of the Rule", 8 and the further
view that an "inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiffs who may sue
in this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good."'9
The impact has profoundly changed the course of development of the law
surrounding Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. It is in the midst of this new
environment that the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Shores v. Sklar, and
the subsequent decisions in Panzirer v. Wolf and Abrams v. JohnsManville Corp., which together articulate antifraud liability based upon
extension of the established "fraud-on-the-market theory" to "integrity"
of the market, must be confronted.
In Shores, a sharply divided en banc panel upheld the assertion of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims by the purchaser of certain revenue
bonds who alleged that the securities were "fraudulently" marketed, but
who admitted that he had neither seen nor otherwise relied upon the
disclosure document relating to the bonds containing alleged
misrepresentations or omissions of material facts. The majority found
the basis for Rule 10b-5 libability in a "broader theory of fraud" premised
upon the fraudulent creation and distribution of the bonds in the
marketplace which presumably would have been available for purchase
otherwise.
Panzirerrecognized the validity of a Rule 10b-5 claim relating to an
allegedly fraudulent annual report which the purchaser never saw. The
information was said to have led to statements made in a financial news
column of the Wall Street Journal,however, which portrayed the issuer
, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
"6567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). In an opinion by Judge
Friendly, the Goldberg court distinguished Santa Fe by reason of the misleading public
disclosures and the availability of a state court injunctive remedy.
",See, e.g., Healy v. Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3rd Cir.
1980); Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co., Inc. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co.,
606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979); Kidwell ex rel Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979);
Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,689, at 98,
617 (D. Del. 1980).
Whether or not these cases, in creating an exception to Santa Fe, operate to undermine the intent of the Supreme Court, clearly the focus on deception under Rule 10b-5 is
now paramount.
" Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723, 736 n. 8 (1975).
Id. at 747-48.
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in a favorable light in the marketplace, and on which the purchaser
relied. Similarly, Abrams upheld Rule 10b-5 claims by an investor who
had not read disclosure documents which contained allegedly false or
misleading information. Rather than focusing upon fraudulent creation
or marketing of the securities involved, these courts viewed the deficient disclosures-the "fraud"-as affecting either the totality of information available in the marketplace, or the market price for the shares.
The concept of "fraud-on-the-market" is not a new one in securities
law liability. Indeed it previously formed the basis for important procedural determinations in securities litigation which have, in turn, produced substantive law in the area. 0 The emergence of the principle,
restated in terms of "integrity" of the market, to sustain antifraud
claims absent any traditional nexus between allegedly deficient
disclosure documents and investment decisions stands rather
dramatically in contrast to the sense of the post-1975 decisions of the
Supreme Court. Indeed it stands in conflict with positions in other circuits. The extreme example in Shores, that the very creation and
distribution of the securities constituted a "fraud" on the market irrespective of any consideration of deficient disclosure documents, raises
fundamental questions in relation to the proper scope and application of
the antifraud provisions. Panzirer,although more traditionally oriented
toward information dissemination, raises equally fundamental questions
of causation that neither can nor should be disposed of on presumptions
or suppositions of pre-1975 vintage. Panzirersimilarly contributed to a
conflict among the circuits.
This article focuses upon the origins of the "fraud-on-the-market" approach to antifraud claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and considers the current applications in depth, particularly in light of the
post-1975 decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In a legal environment demonstrably and increasingly skeptical, if not hostile, to expansive interpretations of the federal securities laws, Shores and Panzirer are anonomolous, if not outrightly aberrant, in their treatment of
elements which have been and continue to be fundamental to determining the scope of coverage of the implied private right of action under
Rule 10b-5, namely, causation and reliance. In one form or another these
elements form the basis of the necessary relationship between an investment decision - the object of antifraud protection - and a Rule 10b-5 prohibited act. 21 Their respective approaches to Rule 10b-5 claims based
I See text accompanying notes 31-57 infra.
2 Reliance in Rule 10b-5 analysis is more precisely addressed as an aspect of causationin-fact, which is in all cases one of the determinative factors as to the scope of coverage. The
development of the case law under Rule 10b-5 has been shaped signficantly by varying interpretations of the parameters of the element and its own subclasses: transaction causation
and loss causation. "Transaction causation" turns upon a direct causal connection between
the transaction complained of and the offending act. "Loss causation" means only that nexus
between the offending act and the economic harm exists. See Comment, 32 WASH. & LEE L.
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upon "integrity of the market" invited careful scrutiny, for they seemingly stand at the crossroads on the way to future development of the
scope of Rule 10b-5. In evaluating these current approaches to investor
protection, this article shall first examine the roots of the "fraud-on-themarket" notion and its early and ostensibly procedural applications.
When coupled with pre-1975 policy analysis, the roots of the notion and
its early applications set the stage for broadened applications. The article will then turn to the post-1975 decisions of the Supreme Court and
their progeny, fundamental policy and legal analysis of the elements of a
Rule 10b-5 claim. The article concludes with an in-depth analysis of the
Shores and Panzirerapproaches, the conclusions to be drawn from them,
and their vitality in the future dynamics of the law. Finally, the article
addresses the role of causation in those future dynamics.
II.

THE ORIGINS OF "FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET" AND ITS
EARLY APPLICATIONS UNDER RULE 10b-5

In Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp." the scope of
Rule 10b-5 protection in a private action was first addressed in a meaningful way. The Joseph court considered what class of persons may
recover in such an action. Plaintiff asserted Rule 10b-5 claims arising out
of the open market purchase of shares of stock in a company based upon
published information regarding the Company's financial condition.
When later the Company disclosed the true facts about its financial condition, the price of the stock fell, and plaintiff sued the defendant directors for the difference. The District Court dismissed the complaint upon
grounds that no "semblance of privity" existed between the plaintiffs

REv. 693 (1975). Ascertaining the presence of requisite causation-in-fact in terms of either
the more restrictive transaction causation or less restrictive loss causation approach
historically, by design or otherwise, has turned upon the type of Rule 10b-5 violation alleged. Compare Schlick v. Penn Dixie Cement Co., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974) (only loss causation necessary where manipulation scheme depressed market price for shares in merger
transaction) with Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940
(1977) (alleged misrepresentations not causally connected to plaintiff's decision to sell
shares). The differing approaches resulted in no small measure from the analysis of the
Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-154 (1972). The
Court in Affiliated Ute opined that in a case involving "primarily a failure to disclose," requisite causation is established when an obligation to disclose exists, and the facts withheld
are material "in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important" in making his investment decisions. Moreover, in Supt. of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), the Court, interpreting the "in connection with" lanuage of
Rule 10b-5, without any particular reference to disclosure deficiencies, rejected any restrictive transaction causation approach to Rule 10b-5 claims involving schemes to defraud.
The unmistakeable post-1975 turn toward a more restrictive definition of Rule 10b-5's
proper scope brought with it renewed consideration of the importance of causation-in-fact.
See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976); Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider &
Co., 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978). Shores and Panzirer now literally compel it.
99 F.Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), affd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
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and the defendant directors. Whether or not the "semblance of privity"
referred to in Joseph means reliance,' the court for certain required
that a direct causal connection exist between would-be claimants under
Rule 10b-5 and defendants' misdeeds. Later cases in the Second Circuit
and elsewhere emphasized reliance as an element of a Rule 10b-5 claim,24
and indeed some went so far as to engraft a reasonableness requirement
upon the reliance element.'
The seeds of a broadened scope of coverage in the open-market setting were sown in 1968 with the decisions in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.2" and Heit v. Weitzen,' in which the court viewed fraudulent conduct
as directed toward trading markets as a whole. In Texas Gulf Sulphur
the Second Circuit focused upon the "in connection with" language of
Rule 10b-5 in enunciating this view of its role vis-a-vis the impersonal
open-market setting.' The court thus established the root of the "fraudon-the-market" theory of Rule 10b-5 liability by directing attention to
the impact of a Rule 10b-5 proscribed act on a generalized market and to
those members of the investing public who suffer from that act "in connection with" their trading.
Heit v. Weitzen, decided by the same court just a short time later,
cemented the development. The representative plaintiff brought Heit as
a class action on behalf of purchasers of securities of Belock Instrument
Corporation who alleged, among other things, that the corporation failed
to disclose material facts in its annual report, public statements and SEC
filings concerning income. The named plaintiffs sought to represent a
class of purchasers of the securities in open-market transactions. The
plaintiffs allegedly purchased at prices which they contended the defendants artifically inflated by disseminating bad information. On defendants' motion to dismiss, the court, confronted with the private action

The Joseph court reasoned that nothing in the history of the Act or the Rule permits the far reaching effect sought herein by the plaintiffs. A semblance of privity between
the vendor and purchaser of the security in connection with which the improper act, practice or course of business was invoked seems to be requisite and it is entirely lacking here.
99 F.Supp. at 706.
24 See, e.g., Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969h Janigan v. Taylor,
344
F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); List v. Fashion Park, Inc. 340 F.2d 457
(2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Kohler v. Kohler, 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Ross v. Licht, 263 F.Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
n See City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 442 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
905 (1970).

401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).

" 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
' The court held that:
Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are made, as here, in a manner
reasonably calculated to influence the investing public ... if such assertions are
false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of whether the
issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes.
401 F.2d at 858-862.
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counterpart to Texas Gulf Sulphur, concluded that plaintiffs met the "in
connection with" requirement.'
Together Texas Gulf Sulphur and Heit established the principle that
a Rule 10b-5 violation may relate to an entire marketplace and affect all
purchases and sales in that marketplace, a decidedly significant departure from the earlier Joseph approach to scope of coverage. Further
development of the principle came in a decidedly procedural setting.
As noted above, Heit arose as a class action on behalf of all persons
who purchased the subject securities and suffered loss as a result. Plainly the generalized market orientation is critical to the procedural propriety of a class action, a form of action which'presupposes identity of interest and status among class members, and that would be subject to
serious challenge on an application of a restrictive rule requiring a
privity-type relationship among all class members and defendants. Indeed a prerequisite to proceeding with class action litigation is the finding, among other things, that questions of law or fact common to the
class members predominate over questions affecting only individual
members." How the relationship between an individual plaintiff and a
Rule 10b-5 proscribed act is defined is obviously of controlling
significance in this procedural context. If the requisite relationship is
one of traditional privity or reliance, the individual question
predominates. Texas Gulf Sulphur and Heit paved the way toward finding commonality through "fraud-on-the-market", and the procedural
analysis in Green v. Wolf Corporation3 led to further substantive
development of the point.
Green originiated as a class action on behalf of open-market purchasers of common stock and debentures of the defendant corporation.
The named plaintiffs focused on alleged information deficiencies in three
prospectuses covering the security and sought recovery under Rule
10b-5. The plaintiffs alleged that material misrepresentations and omissions in the disclosure documents artificially inflated the price of the
stock and that the plaintiffs relied upon the defective information in purchasing those securities. The central issue in the case was the propriety
of a class action in the circumstances presented. Of particular concern
was the effect of .a reliance requirement for a Rule 10b-5 claim upon requisite commonality of would-be class members. While the court was
satisfied that the complex factual background of the case as related to
defendants' liability presented a "common and consistent course of conduct" vis-a-vis the putative class, and thus was suited for class action
treatment,32 the defendants' contention that "each person injured must
' 402 F.2d at 913; see also Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th
Cir. 1971) (the privity requirement vanished from 10b-5 proceedings while the "connection"
element is retained).
o FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
32 Id at 300.
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show that he personally relied on the misrepresentations in order to
recover' ' 3 obviously jeopardized the predominance of common questions
among the class members. While recognizing that reliance is an issue
"lurking" in every action under Rule 10b-5, the Green court refused to
accept the proposition that individual questions of reliance, if they existed, should bar class action status. To do so would negate any attempted class action. The court decreed instead that it could determine any
issue of individual reliance via separate trials on the issue, if necessary.
With the stage thus set, the cases to follow wholly embraced the notion put forward in Green that a generalized market may be affected by
Rule 10b-5 proscribed conduct. Furthermore, the cases demonstrate that
requisite causation-or "nexus" -between such wrongful conduct and
individual participants in that marketplace being so established, no furthur individual issue, reliance or otherwise, was relevant or controlling.',
Green and its progeny effectively eliminated reliance as an element of a
Rule 10b-5 claim in the class action setting-an important substantive
product from a decidedly procedural orientation. The decision of the
Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States3 5 provided the
impetus toward even broader relaxation of the causation requirement
under Rule 10b-5.
Affiliated Ute involved allegations under Rule 10b-5 of a failure to
disclose material information that securities purchased from members of
the plaintiff class were selling for a higher price elsewhere. Confronting
the question of reliance, Mr. Justice Blackman noted that:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite
to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be
material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have conThe
sidered them important in the making of this decision ....
obligation to disclose and the withholding of a material fact
establish the requisite element of causation in fact. 6
Following Affiliated Ute and its express rejection of "positive proof
of reliance" as a prerequisite to Rule 10b-5 recovery in an omission setting, the lower courts generally regarded the case as establishing a
Id. at 301.
See, e.g., Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47
F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). As the plaintiffs in Herbst advanced, and the court accepted, the impact of the misrepresentations was
on the market, manifested in a heightened market price for securities.
406 U.S. 128 (1972).
Id. at 153-154. The Supreme Court had actually first addressed a relaxed causation
standard in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), a decision arising under §
14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9, which prohibits misstatements and omisions of
material facts in proxy material. In that situation the Mills Court held materiality to be the
only element necessary to establish causation under Rule 14a-9. 396 U.S. at 385.
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"presumption" of reliance in nondisclosure cases.37 At the same time Affiliated Ute, with its principal emphasis on loose causation as the key element, provided further meaningful contribution to full-fledged
emergence of fraud-on-the-market as a basis for Rule 10b-5 recovery,
without regard to any distinctions between affirmative misrepresenation and "primarily" nondisclosure cases."
The eradication of traditionMl reliance as an element of Rule 1Ob-5
"fraud-on-the-market" claims in open-market settings, and the
emergence in its place of a loose causation approach to the scope of
coverage, lent itself to broadened applications. In Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce,Fenner& Smith, Inc,39 for example, the Second Circuit applied loose causation analysis to establish a sufficient causal link between the defendants' failure to disclose material, nonpublic information
to the marketplace prior to engaging in securities transactions, and
transactions by all individuals in that "tainted" marketplace. Applying
the so-called "disclose or abstain" rule of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co."0 , Shapiro turned upon the court's determination that defendants owed a duty to disclose to the entire open market, and that the breach of
that duty resulted in liability to all participants in that market who suffered losses. In so imposing liability, the court opined that to do otherwise would frustrate a major purpose of the antifraud provisions, namely, "to ensure integrity and efficiency of the securities markets."'"
In a different setting, InternationalControls Corp. v. Vesco4" upheld
the application of Rule 10b-5's broad "umbrella of protection" over the
securities markets. The InternationalControls court held that a spin-off
of a subsidiary's stock to shareholders of the parent corporation as a
dividend in kind under circumstances involving deficient disclosure of information concerning the self-dealing character of the transactions by
the controlling stockholder, along with the disposition of various assets,
constituted a "fraud" on the corporation within the purview of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.43
I See, e.g., Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1975); Carras v.
Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975). But see Chelsea Associates v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d
1266 (6th Cir. 1975) ("presumption" of reliance in a non-disclosure setting not conclusive). As
to the role of presumed reliance vis-a-vis class action determinations, see, Herbst v. ITT,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) J 94,481, at 95,682 (2d Cir. 1974);
Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles [1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,730, at
96,420 (E.D. Mo. 1974); Parish v. Boetel & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP
(CCH)194,802, at 96,666 (D. Neb. 1974); Entin v. Borg, 60 F.R.D. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
" 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973); see also In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,844, at 96,844 (S.D. Cal. 1974);
where Judge Turrentine reflected that the fraud-on-the-market theory eliminates the need
for proof of individual reliance. Instead it is sufficienj to show only a "common scheme to
manipulate the price of the stock." See also 61 F.R.D. at 101.
495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
40 See text accompanying note 56 infra.
" 495 F.2d at 236-37.
,2490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
's See 490 F.2d at 1356.
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The sense of InternationalControls was certain-conduct involving
securities jeopardized the integrity of the "securities markets," despite
the fact that such conduct was not market-oriented in the sense of a
traditional price manipulation or artificial price based upon disclosure
deficiencies, and despite the fact that the plaintiff was neither an open
market purchaser or seller in the traditional sense." By extending the
"umbrella" of Rule 10b-5 protection, the International Controls court
rendered a policy judgment that the plaintiff, as a participant in a
securities transaction, was quite simply "well deserving" of antifraud
protection for the sake of preserving public confidence in the securities
markets. This application of Rule 10b-5 came in 1974 at a time when the
expansionist view of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 vis-a-vis corporate
"mismanagement" and breach of fiduciary responsibilities was at its
peak.45 At the time, however, International Controls recognized the
broad notion of market integrity-or "confidence" -which provided a
basis for subjectively extending Rule 1Ob-5 coverage apart
from any con46
sideration of elements such as reliance or causation.
From this view a transition to a generalized conduct orientation such
as that evidenced in Competitive Associates v. Laventho Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath47 was achieved. In Competitve Associates; an accounting firm faced allegations that it violated Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 for certifying false or misleading financial statements of an investment fund. Plaintiff in the case alleged that the accountants' conduct
resulted in an overstatement of the fund's performance and was part of a
"fraudulent scheme" to induce the plaintiff to retain a particular fund
manager at whose hands the plaintiff then suffered grievous losses.
Disputed evidence indicated that the plaintiff's representative had not
seen the financial statements of the fund and, hence, did not rely on
them in considering the decision to hire the manager.
The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant on
the grounds that proof of direct reliance on the financial statementsin
question was a requisite element of the claim. Further, even if the subject statements represented an inducement to plaintiff to hire the
" Standing to bring the action was an important issue the court confronted. The plaintiff was the corporation that had been looted through the issuance of a dividend in kind of
its subsidiary's stock. Defendant argued that such a disposition of securities occurred
without "value", and thus was not a sale within securities law protection.
In light of the broad "umbrella of protection" placed over securities transactions by
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the court, on policy grounds, deemed plaintiff to be a seller of the
securities in question, despite the fact that prior examinations of spin-off situations provided no help. 490 F.2d at 1345.
"5See Supt. of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 6 (1971). In Bankers Life
the Court upheld assertion of Rule 10b-5 liability for conduct amounting, essentially, to conversion. The Court considered the "in connection with" language of Rule 10b-5, and announced the broad "touch" test for its application. 406 U.S. at 12-13.
" See 490 F.2d at 1356.
" [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,090, at 97,863 (2d Cir.
1975).
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manager, a relationship between the "fraudulent" acts and omissions
and the securities transactions which caused the plaintiff's injuries was
absent.
On appeal from that determination, the Second Circuit reversed.
Speaking for the court, Judge Hays viewed Affiliated Ute as dispositive
of a reliance requirement in the circumstances presented. 8 Whether or
not liability under Rule 10b-5 required proof of positive reliance, the Second Circuit's assessment still focused on alleged deficient disclosure and
its relationship to ultimate securities transactions. It was that relationship that posed the greatest question. On that score the court changed
course to focus on what it referred to as substantial collateral conduct
which, along with omissions and misrepresentations comprises a "comprehensive scheme to defraud."49 Regarding the relationship, or nexus,
between the ultimate transactions and the alleged fraud, the Competitive Associates court accepted the allegation of a fraudulent scheme
"directly related to the trading process" which, on the basis of conflicting
inferences in the record, the plaintiff should have an opportunity to
5
prove .1
This emergent orientation was, of course, highly complementary to
the fraud-on-the-market theory of Rule 10b-5 coverage continuing to
51
develop in the procedural setting. Blackie v. Barrack,
a case prominently
figuring in the current fraud-on-the-market decisions, best exemplified
that continuing development. Blackie returned to the distinctly procedural setting, presenting the question of the propriety of class action
status for assertion of claims relating to allegedly deficient disclosure of
financial condition in annual reports of Ampex Corporation. The named
plaintiffs sought to represent all purchasers of Ampex securities in the
open market during the period in question. The essential allegation was
that Ampex Corporation made misrepresentations in annual and interim
financial reports, press releases and SEC filings from the date of the company's 1970 annual report until the Company disclosed its true financial
condition in 1972.52 The issue of class action certification was before the
Id.at 97,865. This view, the court noted, founded the court's decision in Shapiro,495
F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
" [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,090, at 97, 866.
0 Id; see also Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1975). The Fifth Circuit
in Woolf further demonstrated a blending of disclosure notions into a conduct orientation.
515 F.2d at 607-608.
524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
Plaintiffs in Blackie alleged that the various financial reports and public statements
overstated earnings, overstated the value of inventories and other assets, concealed various
expenses and costs, misrepresented current ratios, failed to establish adequate reserves for
receivables, failed to write off certain assets, failed to account for proposed discontinuation
of certain product lines, and misrepresented prospects for future earnings. All of the
misrepresentations were cast in nondisclosure terms. The company's financial reporting, for
instance, failed to disclose the need for reserves, conditions reflecting on the value of the inventory, and other facts necessary to make reported figures not misleading.
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Court of Appeals on an interlocutory appeal from the District Court decision conditionally granting that status.
Attacking the propriety of class action status, defendants in Blackie
argued that common questions relating to the adequacy of the various
subject disclosures failed to predominate over necessarily individual
questions of reliance and causation among members of the putative
class. The court rejected the argument on reliance on the same reasoning that paved the way in prior class actions-that proof of subjective
reliance on particular misrepresentations is unnecessary to establish a
Rule 10b-5 claim for deception which artifically inflates the price of a
stock traded in the open market."
None of this is to say that the Blackie court sought to eliminate a
nexus, or causation, requirement as between Rule 10b-5 proscribed conduct and a purchaser's injury. To the contrary, the court reaffirmed that
the plaintiff must demonstrate a "reasonable transactional nexus" between the fraud and the loss. The court viewed its pronouncement as
simply "amplify[ing] on the manner in which that nexus may be
proved"'-by proof of materiality "coupled with the common sense that
a stock purchaser does not ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form
of artifically inflated stock.""5
The Blackie court thus firmly established "fraud-on-the-market" as a
basis for recovery in a private action under Rule 10b-5, with the violative
conduct being causally connected to each transaction in the marketplace
at an artificial price, and the scope of coverage so defined. Through all of
the analytical process the requirement for causal connection, or nexus,
survived. Lost, however, was the definition of nexus in terms of traditional reliance or privity. All of the cases were cast in terms of deficient
disclosure in an open market setting, where a meaningful class-wide Rule
10b-5 remedy demanded the elimination of a traditional reliance or privity
requirement. Affiliated Ute and Shapiro v. MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. departed from this norm in the sense of focusing upon
duties to disclose in what were otherwise pure nondisclosure situations,
and the breach of which was causally connected to subject transactions.
Shapiro might also be viewed as a market-directed conduct case, as opposed to a disclosure case. In Shapiro the act of trading on nonpublic information is proscribed conduct. It is the breach of a duty to disclose the
information or abstain from that trading that gives rise to the liability,
however, rather than the act of trading itself." Pure market-directed.
' 524 F.2d at 907. The court noted that the supposition is that the market price is
validly set and that no manipulation has artificially inflated it. In a sense, then, the market
price of a security is itself an implicit representation that it is validly set.
55Id.

I The so-called "disclose or abstain" rule, and its extension to the totality of a
marketplace, was articulated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The Court recognized that §10(b)

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 39:861

conduct, such as manipulation within the contemplation of Section 9 of
the Exchange Act,"7 for example, did not enter into any of the cases
which proceeded on the fraud-on-the market theory. Clearly, however,
the concept of market "integrity" or "confidence" lurked throughout-as
an expressed basis for recognition of the claim in InternationalControls,
and as a fundamental policy of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to assure
true and honest securities markets.

III. THE IMPACT OF POST-1975 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
ON THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET APPROACH TO RULE 10b-5 LIABILITY

The securities law decisions of the Supreme Court since 1975 have
significantly altered many of the pre-existing expansive conceptions of
the scope of federal securities law protections, and the antifraud provisions in particular. Though none of the cases decided by the Court have
involved "fraud-on-the-market" as an asserted basis of liability, the
Court's analysis of the proper scope and elements of Rule 10b-5 liability
directly impact the essential underpinnings of the theory which stress
the absence of any direct relationship between an alleged Rule 10b-5
violator and a prospective claimant.
The particular decisions of the high Court impacting fraud-on-themarket analysis are Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,58 Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder,9 Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green" and, perhaps
most importantly, Chiarella v. United States." All focus upon the
elements of Rule 10b-5 liability or its proper scope of coverage.2
In Blue Chip Stamps the Court brought finality to the debate over
the long standing rule of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp." that only an
and Rule lOb-5 are predicated "on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace
that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information". 401 F.2d at 848; see also In re Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
57 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976). Section 9 proscribes conduct designed to manipulate prices of
securities traded on a national securities exchange, including wash sales and other activity
designed to convey a false appearance of trading activity. Section 9 also creates an express
right of action establishing the liability of any person "who willfully participates in any act
or transaction" to "any person who shall purchase or sell any security at a price which was
affected by such act or transaction" for "the damages sustained as a result of any such act
or transaction". 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
11425 U.S. 185 (1976).
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
" Though it did not involve consideration of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 directly, the decision
of the Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) is instructive as well.
In TSC the Court enunciated the definition of materiality for purposes of proxy disclosure.
This definition of materiality has since been fully imported into Rule 10b-5 analysis. The
TSC Court established a "general standard" of materiality. 426 U.S. at 449. Clearly, this
view of materiality is transaction oriented and, at least in the traditional disclosure context,
bespeaks of probable effect.
193 F.2d 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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actual purchaser or seller of securities may maintain an action under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Court looked narrowly upon congressional intent and restricted the scope of the private remedy to the
parameters of express remedies contained in other provisions of the Exchange Act.64 Express causes of action provided in the Exchange Act, in
particular Section 965 and Section 18,66 require a direct causal relationship between a claimant's transaction and the proscribed act. Section 18
explicitly requires reliance on the defective statement, as well as a transaction at a price which was "affected" by such statement. Similarly, the
principal express private remedies provided in the Securities Act of
1933, Sections 11 and 12(2), likewise stress a direct relationship, or "transactional" privity, between a purchaser and proscribed conduct, or expanded liability for such conduct, which the statute expressly
7
prescribes.
In both Hochfelder and Santa Fe, the Court further pursued its
strict construction of the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5-rejecting in Santa Fe the notion that "fraud" within the contemplation of
the statute and the Rule should, or could, encompass "all breaches of
fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction."6 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals 9 had formulated an interpretation of the
elements of "fraud" cognizable under Rule 10b-5 based upon the
Supreme Court's earlier expressed notion of "equitable" fraud.70 The
Supreme Court criticized this interpretation as arising from the use of
the term "fraud" in other decisions involving other contexts, and not
focusing on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which by their terms so clearly
address deception and "manipulation".
Previously the Supreme Court in Hochfelder rejected the assertion
, See 421 U.S. at 736.
15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976); see text accompanying note 57 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). Section 11 of the Securities Act creates an express remedy
for a purchaser of securities which are the subject of a registration statement containing a
false or misleading statement. The remedy operates against a specified list of persons who
have a relationship to the defective registration statement and who are unable to satisfy
statutorily prescribed "due diligence" defenses. In certain instances § 11 imposes the further express requirement that plaintiffs rely on the defective disclosure.
Section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976), creates an express right of action for a purchaser
against his or her seller for recission (or damages as a recissional equivalent) of a transaction involving a materially false or misleading disclosure. Though historically not interpreted to represent a strict privity requirement, the "seller" limitation on Section 12(2)
liability has resulted in the requirement of a direct causal involvement in the plaintiff's
transaction. See Rapp, ExpandedLiability UnderSection 12 of the Securities Actk When is
a Seller Not a Seller? 27 CASE WEs. RES. L. REV. 445 (1977).
See 430 U.S. at 472.
e Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
70 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963). There the Court
spoke of "fraud" in terms of acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of a
legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 39:861

of negligence as a basis for imposition of liability in a private action for
damages under Rule 10b-5. This rejection came in light of the statutory
scheme for antifraud protections and in recognition that Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 are explicit in their terms-"manipulation and deception,
and of implementing devices and contrivances." Furthermore, in
Hochfelder the Court specifically rejected the broad scope of coverage
offered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus, that
would have extended liability over ". . . any type of material misstatement or omission, and any course of conduct, that has the effect of
defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not."'"
Collectively, these cases evidence more impact upon fraud-on-themarket theory than an avowed strict construction of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 in terms of who may sue, for what conduct, and who shall be
liable. The Supreme Court's message in these cases is that Rule 10b-5
has a definite transactionalfocus, as to which the Rule protects a buyer
or seller of a security from injury arising out of traditional deception as
to the value of the security bought or sold, or by reason of that value being falsely determined in a marketplace tainted by manipulative activity.
The direct relationship of deceptive or manipulative conduct to an
investment decision determines the scope of Rule 10b-5 coverage rather
than the existence of undesirable conduct somewhere in the milieu of
securities transactions.
The message that the relationship of fraudulent conduct to an investment decision determines the scope of Rule 10b-5, as related to
fraud-on-the-market analysis, was prominently considered in an important aspect of Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc.72 In Ross, the plaintiffs
brought a class action on behalf of all open-market purchasers of Robins
Company securities during an approximate two-year period. Plaintiffs
alleged that the company advertised its "Dalkon Shield" intrauterine
device in medical journals and patient brochures, and made other public
statements and agency filings, without disclosing substantial liability
risks to the company associated with the product which would result in
loss of sales or revenues. Plaintiffs thus alleged that the company and
certain of its officers and directors violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
in deceiving the investing public concerning the true financial condition
and prospects of the company, as related to the Dalkon Shield, and thus
"manipulated" the market price for Robins' shares.73
71
7

See 425 U.S. at 212.
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (OCH)

96,388, at 93,350 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

" Plaintiffs more particularly alleged that:
Said advertisements and the representations contained therein had the effect, as
Robins and the individual defendants knew, of manipulating the market price for
A.H. Robins securities in that, inter alia, they were designated [sic] to promote,
stimulate, and to increase (a) the sales of the Dalkon Shield and A.H. Robins earnings and profits therefrom and (b) the standing and reputation of A.H. Robins as a
developer and producer of safe, reliable and effecacious [sic], ethical phar-
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Defendants moved to dismiss the Ross complaint on the contention
that advertising in medical journals and patient brochures could not be
viewed as sufficiently connected to the plaintiffs' purchases to support
the application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for the alleged deception.
Plaintiffs countered with the argument that the effect of the statements
made in advertising and brochures was a "fraudulent" increase in
overall sales and prosperity of the company, and that such effect constituted "a form of market manipulation which inflated the price of
Robins' stock." The District Court applied Santa Fe to deny Rule 10b-5
coverage.15 The court dismissed those portions of the plaintiff's complaint based upon the claimed impact of advertisements in the medical
journals and patient brochures. Subsequent consideration of the case by
the Second Circuit on other issues raised by subsequent pleadings" left
the district judge's determination on the matter of the advertisements
as an improper basis of Rule 10b-5 .coverage untouched.'
On the foundation of Santa Fe, the defendants failed to persuade the
court that advertisements in medical journals and patient brochures
could provide sufficient nexus. Nor was the court convinced that company statements about a new product were of such "subject matter" as
to be reasonably expected to impact investor decisions with regard to
company securities. Thus, the transactional focus is certain, and the
necessity of a demonstrable causal relationship between would-be
maceutical products, thereby affecting A.H. Robins sales, earnings, growth and
overall prosperity." [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,388, at
93,351, quoting, Complaint, 20.
1' Id. at 93,352.
75Id.
76 The court dismissed the balance of the complaint with leave to replead upon grounds
that plaintiffs had failed to plead with the requisite particularlity prescribed by Rule 9(b),
FED. R. Civ. P. The court subsequently considered an amended complaint on a motion to
dismiss. 465 F. Supp. 904. The court again dismissed, but this time on grounds that § 18 was
plaintiff's exclusive remedy for false or misleading statements made in reports or
documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the 1934 Act. The
court refused to imply a remedy under § 10(b). On appeal the court reversed this conclusion.
Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,115,
at 96,181 (2d Cir. 1979). With the focus of the subsequent pleadings being placed on
Associated Press releases and documents and reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Second Circuit was satisfied that Rule 10b-5 claims based upon an
artifically inflated market price were consistent with the "fundamental policies" recognizing
that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are the "primary mechanisms by which open market investors
can seek redress against those who manipulate the market by fraudulent activity:' Id. at
96,190.
" In the Ross decision the court fully embraced the vitality of the long-standing principle enunciated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.:

Rule 1Ob-5 is violated whenever assertions are made . . . in a manner

reasonably calculated to influence the investing public, e.g. by means of the financial media ... if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to
mislead irrespective of whether the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes. 401 F.2d at 862. -
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"fraud" and an investment decision is clear. The court did not implement
Santa Fe to deny such a relationship where the alleged informational
deficiency is value determinative vis-a-vis company securities and
presented in a cognizable medium, 8 but it recognized that cognizable
"fraud" for purposes of Rule 10b-5 coverage does not occur in a vacuum.79
The most recent Supreme Court consideration of the scope of Rule
10b-5 in Chiarellav. United States"0 brings the matter into bold perspective. Chiarellafocused upon the asserted criminal liability under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of an employee of a financial printer. The employee
deduced the names of target companies for certain upcoming takeover
bids from documents delivered to the printing firm, purchased the subject securities in advance of public announcements of the bids and profitably sold them thereafter. The jury convicted the defendant on all
counts of a seventeen count indictment following the District Court's
charge to the jury that the jury could convict the defendant if it found
that he had willfully failed to inform sellers of the target companies'
stocks in which he traded, and that he knew of the material nonpublic information concerning the forthcoming takeover bids that would make
the securities more valuable in the marketplace. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction." The Supreme Court then addressed the question
whether silence in the absence of a duty to speak gives rise to liability
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In an opinion by Justice Powell the
Court held that it did not, and reversed the conviction.
Starting with the premise that liability under Rule 10b-5 for nondisclosure depends upon the existence of a duty to disclose, the Court
emphasized that a purchaser of stock who is neither a corporate insider
nor a fiduciary, both positions giving rise to a cognizable duty, has no
obligation to reveal material facts.2
Though Chiarellaaddressed the would-be liability of one engaging in
trading on the basis of material nonpublic information, the Court's rejection of a nonspecific market-directed duty under Rule 10b-5 is much
broader, especially when considered in conjunction with Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green," in which the Court underscored the scope of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as being defined solely in terms of the statutory

," The court approved the view that two factors affect the scope of Rule 10b-5
coverage vis-a-vis information dissemination: the medium through which the statement is

made and the subject matter of the statement. See A. JACOBS,

THE IMPACT OF RULE

10b-5, §

65, at 3-283 (1977).
': See also Nash v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 570 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1978)
(allegation that merger transaction "destroyed the market" for the subject securities held
not to amount to manipulation of prices within contemplation of Rule 10b-5 after Santa Fe).
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
81 588 F.2d 1358 (1978).
8' See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (corporate insiders);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (fiduciaries).
" 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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language. 4 Though Santa Fe focused principally on the question of
"deception", the Court's observations on the notion of "manipulation"
are instructive. 5 The Court's views of Rule 10b-5 covered "deception"
and "manipulation", as expressed in Santa Fe, coupled with the view as
to the necessary relationship between a putative violator and a plaintiff,
as expressed in Chiarella,demonstrate the real significance and impact
of the post-1975 developments on Rule 10b-5 applications. The Court's
contemporary decisions, and these two in particular, clearly indicated
that Rule 10b-5 does not address all bad conduct, however reprehensible,
simply because the conduct touches upon- or indeed impacts a security
transaction.8 Rule 10b-5 is not an all-powerful purifier of the securities
markets. As the Court emphasized in Chiarella, neither the Congress
nor the SEC has ever imposed a market-directed parity-of-information
rule. 7 To imply a broad, nonspecific duty from a nonexistent relationship
between persons buying and selling in that market-place would be "inconsistent with the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation
of the securities markets."88 This is not to say that whenever false or
misleading assertions are made in a manner "reasonably calculated ... to
influence the investing public",89 Rule 10b-5 will not operate, or that
traditionally recognized market manipulation should escape the Rule's
protective umbrella. It is to say, however, that the proper application of
the Rule requires demonstration of a direct connection or nexus, by way
of breach of an extant duty, or by deception, or by market rigging, between the bad act and the object of antifraud protection: an investment
decision.
If the post-1975 decisions of the Supreme Court have taught nothing
else, they surely taught-that the special object of the entire scheme of
antifraud protection is, and always has been, the decision to buy or sell a
security. Liability under the Rule will not extend to the world at large.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the first of its post-1975
series, the Court affirmed the necessity of the purchaser-seller limitation for implied actions under Rule 10b-5, and emphasized the necessity
of an actual transaction."
" Said the Court: "The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to
prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception". 430 U.S. at 473.
'Id.

Id. at 474-477.
Following the decision in Chiarellq,the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 under the 1934 Act
in attempt to regulate the use of material nonpublic information in trading in tender offers.
With certain exceptions, Rule 14e-3 imposes a "disclose or abstain" rule upon persons who
possess material information relating to a tender offer if that person or his "tippee" knows
or has reason to know that the information is nonpublic and was received from a source
related to the subject corporation. See Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 17120 (Sept. 4,
1980).
445 U.S. at 235.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968).
421 U.S. at 747.
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The focus on investment decisions and the necessary relationship of
Rule 10b-5 conduct to the decisions is fundamentally important in considering the "fraud-on-the-market" theory of liability. The emergent
views of the Supreme Court demonstrate severe erosion in the once
hospitable and expansive interpretations of federal securities law protections that marked pre-1975 analyses. They manifest outright hostility
toward open-ended postulations of liability based upon undefined duties
and national commitments to the remedy of "bad" conduct which happens to occur in proximity to a securities transaction.
Beyond the particular cases which bear directly and critically upon
the scope of liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the post-1975
decisions of the Court, which have consistently refused to expand the
law through the implication of additional private remedies, demonstrate
the disenchantment with pre-1975 trends. These decisions portend further retrenchment and refinement of existing remedies to assure close
adherence to perceived congressional intent as best evidenced by the
language of the statutes, and, when necessary, by policy and by commercial and economic realities. In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman91 the Court declined to permit application of the antifraud protections of the securities laws to the purchase of "stock" in a statesponsored housing cooperative. Common sense and economic reality dictated that purchasers of the "stock" in question were not investors in an
enterprise, but rather individuals seeking a place to live.2 Piperv. Chris
Craft Industries, Inc. 3 rejected implication of a private remedy under
the tender offer provisions of the Exchange Act for a defeated tender offeror against a target company and competing offeror. Among other
things, the Court refused to view "the narrow intent" of this aspect of
federal regulation of securities as supporting an extension of coverage of
a federal remedy to the claimant. 4 In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,"
denying implication of any private right of action under Section 17(a) of
the Exchange Act, the Court looked entirely to the face of the statute to
determine whether the Court might imply any private remedy. In doing
so the Court emphasized that invocation of the "remedial purposes" of
the 1934 Act could not and would not carry the day."6
The signal in all of this bodes ill for those who would paint in broad
strokes on the matter of expanding the scope of antifraud coverage into
" 421 U.S. 837 (1975). See also International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
" The Forman Court discussed the proper scope of federal securities law protections,
emphasizing the focus on "capital markets" and the sale of securities to raise capital. 421
U.S. at 849.
9 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
Id. at 38.
9 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
Id. at 578, quoting, SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978). See also Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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areas or in a manner not firmly rooted in traditional deception or
delimited by traditional elements. It is into this dramatically altered
judicial environment that Shores v. Sklar has been delivered, and in
which the fraud-on-the-market theory of Rule 10b-5 liability has seen its
maximum extension. Whether it can survive that environment is considered below.
IV.

SHORES

v. SKLAR-THE VERY EXISTENCE OF SECURITIES
AS A "FRAUDULENT SCHEME"

In 1972, the Industrial Development Board of Fresco City, Alabama
authorized issuance of First Mortgage Revenue Bonds for the purpose of
financing the construction of and equipping a facility of Alabama Supply
and Equipment Company for the construction of mobile homes. The law
of Alabama authorized industrial development financing through local
Industrial Development Boards having the authority to issue tax-exempt
bonds. With the proceeds of such an issue, industrial facilities may be
constructed and then leased to a manufacturing, industrial or commercial enterprise-in this case Alabama Equipment and Supply Company
("ASECo"). The enterprise is obligated, by way of rent payments, for
satisfaction of principal and interest payments on the bonds. Because
such bonds do not represent obligations bf the municipality, the financial
position of the lessee enterprise is highly significant in evaluating the
worth of the bonds. The subject bonds in Shores were issued in connection with, and indeed had their genesis with ASECo, and Investors
Associates of America, Inc., a Tennessee underwriting firm. 7
Hamilton, president of Investors Associates, retained the defendant
Sklar: a Tennessee attorney, to act as bond counsel in connection with
the offering. As bond counsel, Sklar in turn directed that Hamilton's firm
conduct an "investigation" of ASECo. Sklar also retained Alabama
counsel to act as bond co-counsel, to assist in preparation of paperwork
and to issue requisite opinions concerning authorization and issuance of
the bonds under Alabama law.
In connection with issuance of the bonds, Sklar prepared an "Offering Circular" from material furnished to him by the underwriter, Investors Associates, by ASECo, and by the individuals associated with
both. Facts Sklar allegedly knew, or recklessly disregarded and omitted
from the offering circular, included facts relating to a prior SEC enforcement action against the underwriter, the true worth of valuable real
estate ASECo allegedly owned, and prior business success and experience of Harrelson, ASECo's president. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged
a financial statement incorporated into the offering circular was

Neither ASECo nor anyone associated with it possessed any financial or business accumin. The Court described ASECo's employees as essentially "inept and unsophisticated"
in the business undertaken.
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materially false or misleading because of numerous misrepresentations
and omissions concerning the value of various ASECo assets. Plaintiff
likewise alleged that the underwriter, the successor underwriter who actually offered the bonds for sale to the public on the basis of the offering
circular,"5 and the bank which acted as trustee of the bond proceeds
knew or recklessly disregarded these disclosure deficiencies.
Shores focused upon the purchase of bonds by Bishop. Bishop learned
of the bonds in conversation with an Alabama securities dealer, who
described them as a good investment opportunity. The dealer informed
Bishop of others in the community who purchased such bonds. Bishop
never saw the Offering Circular, or knew that one existed. He bought
four of the bonds, however, on his broker's oral recommendation, and as
part of the purchase of several other municipal securities.
Shortly after construction of the facility for which the bond financing had been obtaine was completed, all operations ceased and ASECo
defaulted in payr~nt of rent. Harfelson, as individual guarantor,
likewise defaulted and the Trustee Bank declared the lease in default.
Purporting to represent a class of all purchasers of the bonds, Bishop
sued for violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. The District Court repeatedly dismissed, his complaint in the face
of his inability to plead reliance on the Offering Circular-which, he admitted, he neither saw nor read. A sharply divided Fifth Circuit bench,
sitting en banc, vacated the dismissal of Bishop's Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 claims, and premised its decision on the assumption that the very
existence of the security in the marketplace may be a Rule 10b-5
cognizable "fraud".99
The majority analysis of the scope of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
coverage in Shores has two aspects. As to claims of misrepresentations
and omissions in the subject offering circular, the majority agreed that
no antifraud. claim would lie in the face of Bishop's admission that he had
neither read nor attempted to read the document. The majority
characterized such claims as the "usual 10b-5 misrepresentation or omission case.""' But the majority remained unwilling to dispose of the
balance of Bishop's antifraud claim on an application of "usual" criteria.
Instead the majority viewed the broader claim to be that the defendants
engaged in an elaborate scheme to create a bond issue "that would appear genuine but was so lacking in basic requirements that the bonds
" Jackson Municipals succeeded Investors Associates of America by assignment
following the determination by Investors Associates that it did not possess sufficient capital
to underwrite the issue. The Court characterized Jackson Municipals and its chief executive, Lamberson, as being fully cognizant of disclosure deficiencies relating to the offering materials and of the true facts concerning ihe backgrounds of individuals involved. See
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,033 at 91,332.
The majority viewed the antifraud provisions as covering deliberate, manipulative
"schemes" which annul the market's "honest function." Id. at 91,330.
" Id. at 91,333.
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would never have been approved by the Board nor presented by the
underwriters had any one of the participants in the scheme not acted
with intent to defraud or in reckless disregard of whether the other
defendants were perpetrating a fraud."1' ' Viewed in this light, the offering circular was but one part in a much more complex drama. Though no
nexus or relationship, direct or indirect, existed between Bishop and any
perpetrator of the alleged fraud, though he claimed no breach of any particular duty the defendants owed him and though his investment decision was not specific as to these bonds or the result of any deficient
disclosure, the majority viewed his allegations as allowing him to introduce proof that he sought to make investments which were entitled
to be marketed. In addition under subsections (1) and (3) of Rule 10b-5,
his complaint was not subject to dismissal for failure to state a
cognizable claim. 102
The majority's view of the case literally cried out for consideration
of causation, or the absence thereof, as bearing upon the availability of a
Rule 10b-5 remedy. The issue was given scant attention, however, with
the majority being satisfied that the "concept" of the scheme to defraud
presented in the case demonstrated "transaction causation." ' 3
04
The majority approach to causation in Shores extends Blackie'
and
its fraud-on-the-market theory well beyond the parameters of its prior
applications. In the first place Blackie and most of its progenitors focused
upon deficient disclosure to an impersonal market in which transactions
occurred at an assertedly artificial price made artificial by the deficient
disclosure. The fundamental proposition of the entire fraud-on-themarket line of cases is that market-oriented deception which results in
an artificially inflated or deflated market price of a security results in
Rule 10b-5 liability. The "bad" act is, at least in theory, causally connected to each transaction in that market at a price so affected. Whether
this approach to liability can survive the post-1975 retrenchment remains an open question. Certainly however, the Shores majority's attention of it to cover the concept of market integrity without the slightest
regard to any deficient disclosure is unfounded. In Blackie itself the
court recognized that while the materiality of a misrepresentation
o Id.

Id. at 91,334.
Id. (footnote omitted). Without elaboration, the Shores majority concluded that it
was unnecessary to decide whether it should draw any distinction between the notion of
"loss causation" and "transaction causation" like the Court did in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974). The majority noted, however, that were the focus on
misrepresentations and subsection (2) under Rule 10b-5, the Court might require a
"separate showing of transaction causation" and that the Court would determine causation
in terms of reliance. To do otherwise, said the majority "... . could establish a scheme of investors insurance." [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,033 at 91,334 n.5.
On the significance of the distinction; see generally Crane, An Analysis of Causation Under
Rule 10b-5, 9 SEc. REG. L.J. 99 (1981).
"1 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
"

"o
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establishes causation under the principle of Affiliated Ute, that
presumption only operates to shift the burden to defendants to disprove
it. One of the ways defendants may disprove the presumption is to
demonstrate that an insufficient number of market traders relied upon
the deficient disclosure to artificially impact the market price." 5 Blackie
undeniably goes to considerable length, and it does so on the proposition
that persons buying in the securities markets legitimately expect that
those markets are free from fraud. Blackie does not go nearly s far in
its concept as the majority in Shores takes it. From the proposition that
deficient disclosure may result in an artificial price for a security in the
markets on which traders presumptively rely, Shores declares that the
very existence of the security without regard to any market-directed
disclosure impugnes the integrity of the marketplace.
Sensing the breadth of its proposition, and in defense against a
stinging dissent, the Shores majority articulated the underpinnings of
its position." 6 The stated, and essential, premises of the majority's decision to uphold the statement of a Rule 10b-5 claim is the fraud-on-themarket theory. Like Blackie, the presumption of impact upon the market
price or value assessment of a security in making an investment decision
operates as its keystone. At the same time, the majority opined that the
demonstration of such an impact without more would preclude recovery.
Presumably if impact on the price were the sole demonstration, the case
would turn only on deficient disclosure, which, as admitted, played no
role in the subject transaction. Circuity abounds.
The Shores majority fully acknowledged that the "scheme" upon
which Rule 10b-5 liability is premised must, under Santa Fe, be one "...
within the 'manipulative' condemnation of the securities law"."7 Though
summarily concluding: "This one clearly is", the majority ignored Santa
Fe's admonition that "manipulation" is "virtually a term of art when
used in connection with securities markets"."8 There is no suggestion of
105

The Blackie court identified the avenues available to defendants as being determined

by the absence of materiality or market effect, and secondly, by demonstrating a plaintiff's
knowledge. See 524 F.2d at 906.
See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,033, at 91,335.
107Id. at 91,335 n.8.
, See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Broad assertions of
"manipulation" as the touchstone for extending Rule 10b-5 coverage have not survived Santa
Fe. For example, in Shivers v. Americo, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,064 at 92,930 (9th Cir. 1982), the court refused to recognize the assertion of Rule 10b-5
claims by minority shareholders of a corporation who accused the majority of "destroying"
the trading market in shares of the stock by certain practices. Plaintiffs in Shivers alleged
that certain actions undertaken by the majority prevented "free and honest balancing of investment supply with investment demand" and constituted "manipulation" of stock prices
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. They based their assertion upon the proposition that Rule
10b-5 prohibits "a broad range of manipulative practices." The Ninth Circuit affirmed
dismissal of the case on other grounds relating to standing. On the "manipulation" claim,
however, the court observed that plaintiffs could state a claim for manipulation only if they
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such conduct in Shores. The "manipulation" in the contemplation of the
majority is simply the introduction of bad securities into the
marketplace.
There can be no quarrel with the majority's view of the broad purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and indeed the entirety of the Exchange Act. Provisions creating on-going disclosure mechanisms,
liberalized antifraud protections and prohibitions on manipulative activities manifest the concern for assuring free and honest markets.
These provisions seek an important object: an informed investment decision. As the post-1975 era has taught, however, broad statements of
remedial purpose neither require nor justify extension of the federal
securities laws to all conduct viewed as "bad".'
The dissenters in Shores would impose a reliance requirement as an
universal limit upon the class of persons who may recover under Rule
10b-5.1'0 Reliance as the limiting factor for the scope of the implied
remedy under Rule 10b-5 remains a subject of debate. However defined,
causation-in-fact is and will always be essential to recognition of a Rule
10b-5 claim. The "fraud on a broader scale" envisioned by the Shores majority is at odds with any traditional notion of causation. The majority
demonstrated sensitivity to this fundamental point, and attempted rationalization based upon the principle of duty so prominent in Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States."' In Affiliated Ute, since the defendants
acted as "market makers" for the stock and were in a position to influence selling decisions, the Supreme Court found that Rule 1ob-5
created an "affirmative duty" to disclose facts to the plaintiff sellers concerning the existence of a better price for their shares. No "reliance" on
material misrepresentations occurred, for the focal point in the case was
a failure to disclose. The Supreme Court viewed the conduct alleged as
constituting a "course of business" or a "device, scheme or artifice that
operates as a fraud and deceit" upon the Indian sellers based upon the
special relationship between them and the defendants." 2
The Shores majority found solace in the Affiliated Ute duty analysis,
and in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp." In Schlick the Court upheld
the statement of a Rule 1Ob-5 claim in a merger and other conduct the
defendants allegedly undertook to manipulate and depress the market
value of securities to achieve an unfair exchange ratio. In this pre-Santa
Fe case the Second Circuit was satisfied that the appellant sold his
shares to Penn-Dixie on the basis of an exchange ratio that reflected
adversely the manipulated market value of his stock. The Second Circuit
alleged that defendants artifically affected market activity in order to mislead investors.
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,604 at 92,933.
"' See [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,233 at 91,344 (dissent).
I

Id. at 91,345.
406 U.S. 128 (1972).
Id. at 153-154.

"'

See text accompanying note 102 supra.
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held that the plaintiffs allegations stated a cognizable claim for relief,
and that it would not require strict transaction causation."' These cases,
in the view of the Shores majority, stand four-square for the proposition
that Rule 10b-5 is not limited to a narrow right to recover for fraudulent
misrepresentations and omissions.
Doubtless few would disagree with this observation, but it begs the
question. Affiliated Ute above all demonstrates the necessity of causation and the importance of a set of circumstances giving rise to a duty,
while breach bf that duty supplies the requisite nexus. In Chiarellathe
Supreme Court most recently dispelled any doubt about the necessity of
such a relationship. Chiarella's act of trading on nonpublic information- of failing to disclose material information in his possession to the
marketplace -tainted that marketplace by creating an informational imbalance. Yet in the absence of Chiarella's duty to that marketplace and
the traders in it, the Supreme Court declined to extend Rule 10b-5
coverage. In a similar situation prior to Chiarellathe Sixth Circuit viewed
proffered logic of causation based upon assumptions of injury to be
flawed."'
Plainly, no assumptions operate to supply requisite causation.
Breach of an extant duty owed to a particular plaintiff can supply that
element, as Affiliated Ute illustrates. But such duties are not imagined,
as Chiarella well illustrates. An imperfect marketplace does not alone
give rise to the existence of a cognizable duty.
Stripped to the.bone, Shores is not at all a fraud-on-the-market case.
The court makes no attempt to justify it in terms of a market price affected by deficient disclosure or nondisclosure in the face of a duty to
disclose. It is, rather, the case of a fraudulently created security which
was marketed. The difference as a matter of law is one of substance and
not semantics. If any act or conduct falls within the purview of Rule
10b-5, it is now clear that such activity must be "fairly viewed as
'manipulative or deceptive' within the meaning of the statute."' Deception is the child of informational deficiency -the principal target of all of
federal securities regulation. Manipulation, the virtual "term of art", has
its own special focus. Both deception and manipulation involve "bad"
conduct, but not all "bad" conduct vis-a-vis securities constitutes
manipulation or deception within the purview of the antifraud provisions. These are the lessons of the post-1975 era.
Shores turns on a simple proposition. The very presence in a
marketplace of a security having no legitimate entitlement to be in the
market place is Rule 10b-5 cognizable fraud. The security's presence is
fraud without regard to the circumstances of any purchase of that
security or the presence or absence of adequate information. The
114507 F.2d 374, 384 (2d Cir. 1974).
5
"'

Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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majority's reasoning, a reaction to reprehensible circumstances, is not
supported by sound legal analysis. The majority was content to note the
absence of any Supreme Court precedent "contrary" to its position," 7
but ignored the obvious sense of virtually every post-1975 decision."'
Under the banner of market "integrity", the Shores majority extended
the umbrella of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 over circumstances involving the use of the market to carry out a "scheme". The scheme did not,
however, impact the investment decision of the plaintiff purchaser except to the extent that the bonds were available for purchase in the first
place. .Whatever remedy may exist for this purchaser as a matter of
state or common law, his claim is not properly the province of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The plaintiff's claim lacks cognizable deception or
manipulation as well as the requisite causation."'
Missing from Shores is the factor which is fundamental to the fraudon-the-market theory of Rule 1Ob-5 coverage-that plaintiff purchased
the security at an artificial price affected by the deficient disclosure of
defendants. That factor was also missing from Panzirerv. Wolf, in which
the Second Circuit, addressing the ."integrity of the market," upheld the
statement of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims by a purchaser of
securities who relied on a favorable mention of a company in the "Heard
on the Street" column in the Wall Street Journal. The plaintiff never
saw the report said to underlie the newspaper comment, but she successfully established a chain of causation when she argued that had the
annual report of the company been accurate, the published comment

.,.See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,033 at 91,335.
"' The dissenters in Shores observed that the decision conflicted with every prior Circuit Court and Supreme Court decision in the field. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,033 at 91,336. See also Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir.
1978). In circumstances not at all unlike Shores, the plaintiff in Vervaecke purchased
hospital authority bonds, but neither saw nor read the offering circular until after his purchase. The plaintiff sought to represent a class of purchasers of the bonds, asserting § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 claims based upon deficient disclosure in the offering documents. The Eighth
Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claims upon finding that the complaint claimed deficient
disclosure in documents which the plaintiff did not read. In doing so, the court rejected any
presumption of reliance-and causation in fact. See 578 F.2d at 717.
"' But see Dekro v. Stern Brothers & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,724,
at 93,631 (W.D. Mo. 1982), in which the court, relying upon Shores, opined that "receipt of a
written offering circular prior to purchase is not the litmus test of causation." Like Shores,
the Dekro case involved the offering and sale of tax exempt bonds. Plaintiffs asserted violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws in connection with oral "sales
pitches" received by them based upon offering circulars which plaintiffs did not see.
Feithful to Shores, plaintiffs alleged that the bond issues were so thoroughly tainted by
fraud as to owe their very existence to fraud. The court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment, recognizing two "alternative" theories of causation in the process: one based
upon the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance in a non-disclosure setting, the other being
"fraud-on-the-market" a la Shores, requiring only a "causal nexus". Such a nexus, according
to the court, may be established by something other than reliance, depending on what is appropriate in the particular case.
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would not have been published, in which case she would not have purchased the securities.
V.

PANZIRER V. WOLF AND THE "CHAIN OF CAUSATION"

Without mention of Shores, the Second Circuit four months after
Shores decided Panzirerv. Wolf."' Plaintiff in Panzirerentered upon a
losing investment in shares of Allied Artists Industries after reading
about the company in the popular "Heard on the Street" column of the
Wall Street Journal. The particular column focused upon the video
cassette market, and devoted two short paragraphs to Allied, including
mention of the company's head start in the pre-recorded video tape and
cassette market, and attractive market prospects for informational and
educational applications. This was an item of particular significance to
the plaintiff, a substitute school teacher."' Indeed the item struck such a
responsive note as to prompt the plaintiff to interrupt her trip to call her
broker with an inquiry concerning any "negative" news. Her broker consulted a Standard & Poor's Corporation tear sheet on Allied and advised
the plaintiff that no negative news appeared. Following these communications Plaintiff, still on the road, placed her order for purchase of
200 shares, and later an additional order for 500 shares. In the weeks and
months following plaintiffs purchases the stock price declined, and eventually Allied filed a Chapter XI petition in bankruptcy.
The plaintiff brought her action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
She alleged that the Allied annual report for the fiscal year, abstracted
in the Standard & Poor's tear sheet that her broker consulted, contained
misrepresentations and omissions relating primarily to the profits of the
company for that year. The abstract omitted a qualification by the company's accountants stating their doubts as to Allied's ability to function
as a going concern. The Company issued the annual report one month
prior to plaintiffs purchases. Plaintiff never saw the annual report, but
asserted in her complaint that it affected the market, and that she relied
on the report by relying on the "integrity of the market." On defendant's
motion for summary judgment the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs
Rule 10b-5 claims. The District Court found that the plaintiff relied
12

663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer,

No. 81,1998.
Il, The column read:
Several analysts contend that Allied Artists is in a good position to take advantage of the growing demand for video tapes, having pioneered the development of recorded cassettes.
Andrew G. Racz of Philips, Appel & Walden, Inc. says Allied Artists, besides
having a head start in video tapes and cassettes, is negotiating with TV networks,
other film producers and makers of educational films to put their films on video
cassettes. "The education and informational area constitutes a tremendous
market for video cassettes", says Mr. Racz, adding: "We continue to be bullish on
Allied Artists. It's an attractive turnaround situation." 663 F.2d at 366.
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"primarily" upon the Wall Street Journalcolumn, and that "secondary"
reliance on the integrity of the market could not support a claim. The Second Circuit reversed since the law provides no support for a distinction
between primary and secondary reliance, and held that the plaintiff
demonstrated a sufficient connection between her loss and the allegedly
fraudulent12 annual report to withstand a motion for summary
judgment. 1
While the Second Circuit held the plaintiff to ultimate proof in tracing her reliance on the alleged fraud through the "reactions of third parties", her claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was not vitiated.
Though the Second Circuit did not instruct what "reaction of third parties" the court contemplated, it appears that the ultimate focus would
necessarily be upon the market price for the security involved.'" The
court offered Blackie v. Barrack as principal authority of the proposition, along with Affiliated Ute.
Were nothing more stated in Panzirer,the result could be viewed in
the light of Blackie and the presumed reliance which provides foundation for traditional fraud-on-the-market theory. The plaintiff sought to
represent a class of purchasers of Allied stock, and the broadly-reasoned
decision is not out of line in the procedural setting. The thrust of the opinion, however, is not on the propriety of class action status. Indeed the
court rejected the plaintiff as a "fit" representative of the purported
class of purchasers because of an "abundantly clear" lack of credibility. 14
What the court pointed out, however, is that the plaintiff failed to
rely on price. She relied instead upon the integrity of the market in producing the information reported in the Wall Street Journal column."'
In its broad-brush view of the "chain of causation", Panzireractually
outdistances Shores v. Sklar in the expansion of the scope of Rule 10b-5
coverage. The case focuses on bad disclosure directed to the impersonal
marketplace -disclosures made126in a manner "reasonably calculated to
influence the investing public."
The "integrity of the marketplace" is the integrity of the market
price at which investors make investment decisions. If materially false
or misleading disclosures artificially inflate the price, persons buying or
selling at that affected price recognizably establish requisite causation
for statement of a Rule 10b-5 claim. The object of protection is an invest" Id. at 367. The court noted that the "validity" of the chain of causation would betested at trial, but that the assertion withstood a motion for summary judgment by reason
of the presumption of reliance accorded to plaintiff.
123Id.
'1 Id. at 368. The court's review of evidence relating to the named plaintiff's fitness as
a class representative demonstrates the importance of the court's emphasis on the broad
"integrity of the market" theory over any consideration of causation based upon particular
items of information or alleged deficient disclosures. Id.
125

'

Id.

See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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ment decision in a market free of manipulative influences. Markets do
not produce information, but rather react to it. The Panzirer court
necessarily says as much by recognizing that the plaintiff would be held
to proof tracing her "reliance" on the fraud through the "reaction of
third parties". The only "reaction" of third parties is manifested in a
market price for the securities which were the subject of the allegedly
deficient information which plaintiff did not see. The court openly
acknowledged that the case did not involve integrity of market price,
and pointed out that the plaintiff's testimony indicated that a lower
price, accurately reflecting the company's true financial position, might
have led her to buy even more stock.'7
The Panzirer court's view of the causation requirement under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires a showing that the fraud was a
"substantial" or "significant contributing cause" to the inquiry of the
plaintiff." Shortly after the decision, Judge Pierce of the Southern
District of New York, who sat by designation in Panzirer,issued his decision in Abrams v. Johns-Manville Corp.1" Abrams was a fraud-on-themarket case based upon annual reports and disclosure documents from
which plaintiffs alleged omitted material information concerning the
company's potential liability in asbestos-related tort litigation. The named
plaintiff in that purported class action admitted that she based her investment decision on her own determination that the stock represented
a "goQd investment", and that she did not read the documents which contained allegedly deficient disclosure. In response to defendant's motion
for summary judgment she noted, however, that the market price affected her decision to buy. Accordingly, on the basis of Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co., Blackie v. Barrack and Panzirer, Judge Pierce correctly
upheld the claim as stating a case of "fraud-on-the-market".' 30
Neither Panzirernor Abrams mentions, let alone reflects upon, any
post-1975 decisions of the Supreme Court as impacting the fraud-on-themarket theory of Rule 10b-5 coverage. Both rest squarely on the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance as underlying their conclusions.
Both are market-directed disclosure cases as opposed to the "bad" con"=633

F.2d at 367 n.3.

"2 See also Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir.
1981). While the Second Circuit in Wilson declined to accept that Rule 10b-5 proscribed conduct must be the "proximate cause" of a plaintiffs harm, it affirmed dismissal of Rule 10b-5
claims relating to disclosures contained in various financial reports and projections since
plaintiffs did not rely on them. Indeed defendants demonstrated that other communications
stimulated the subject purchases and the court rejected any presumption of causation. See
also Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,971,
at 91,009 (3d Cir. 1981). Sharp emphasized another contemporary observation of the Second
Circuit that the court would presume reliance only where it is logical to do so. See Lewis v.
McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980).
" [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,348, at 92,156 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
o Id. at 92,157.
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duct case like Shores. Panzirer can no more ignore the thrust of the
post-1975 cases, however, than can Shores. The fundamental issues are
the same. Allied Artists did not deceive Mrs. Panzirer by false or
misleading disclosures. She bought securities on the basis of a comment
that the commentator presumably would not have made if the commentator knew of the company's true financial condition that a proper annual report would have disclosed. There is little practical difference between this position and that of Bishop in Shores, who presumably would
not have purchased the securities but for the connivance which got them
on to the market in the first place.
The "chain of causation" envisioned in Panzirer is virtually
limitless,' 31 save for the presence somewhere of a Rule 10b-5 proscribed
act that a plaintiff can somehow link to an ultimate investment decision.
In an era marked by the Supreme Court's meaty admonition that: "Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches
must be fraud,"1 31 this approach to the scope of coverage is at best.
troublesome. Though the Panzirercourt viewed its decision as "no more
than an extension of Blackie",3 3 in fact it accomplished the endorsement
of a theory not of fraud-on-the-market, as in Blackie, but fraud by happenstance. There is considerable and obvious danger in this, and it surely is inconsistent with the contemporary pronouncements of the
Supreme Court restricting the scope of Rule 10b-5.
Courts should not leave liability under Rule 10b-5 to chance encounters. The fraud-on-the-market theory, with its presumptions,
recognizes that in the open market setting all transactions at a fraudaffected price are linked to a material disclosure defect. Proof of individual reliance would preclude efficient class action treatment, and
proof of reliance in nondisclosure cases would be impossible. The essential presumption, however, is the link between a Rule 10b-5 proscribed
act and the price of the subject security, an objectively determinable impact. At a fundamental statutory level there is no small significance in
this, for Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act limits an investor's remedy to
actual damages." Actual damage in the open market setting occurs only
by reference to price. To hold that the "integrity of the market price"

In Titan Group, Inc. v. Fagan, 513 F.2d 234, 238-239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
,'s
840 (1975), the Second Circuit emphasized the need for limitation. In Faganthe court focused
on the role of reliance, and observed that materiality and reliance restrict the potential
limitlessness of Rule 10b-5 to situations in which causation in fact exists between the act
and the injury. 513 F.2d at 238. More recent decisions critical of broad fraud-on-the-market
analyses have likewise cautioned that the theory must be applied so as to achieve the intended protections of the securities laws. See Fausett v. American Resources Management
Corp., 14 SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA) 1291 (D. Utah 1982); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Standard
Metal Corp., 14 SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA) 1246 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
"3 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
13 633 F.2d at 368.
'3'15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
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may be disregarded as the determining factor for Rule 10b-5 coverage in
favor of an undefined concept of "integrity of the market in producing information" is to reject any genuine causal limitations upon potential
liability. To assert reliance upon the "integrity of the market in producing information" is to assert that requisite causation will be found where
the court desires to find it, and logic permits assembly of a "chain".' 3
The decision in Kennedy v. Nicastro,"6 decided two months before
Panzirer, highlights the fundamental issue and demonstrates considerable sensitivity to the problem. In Kennedy, the named plaintiff
sought to represent a class of Xcor International shareholders, asserting
claims under the antifraud provisions of both the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 relating to the open market
purchase of Xcor stock. Plaintiff asserted liability based upon claimed
misrepresentations and omissions in various disclosure documents. The
plaintiffs neither relied upon nor read the documents. The plaintiffs
premised liability on the fraud-on-the-market theory and in that regard
relied primarily upon the then recently announced decision in Shores, as
well as Backie v. Barrackand Ross v. A.H. Robins. Plaintiffs specifically
alleged that material misstatements and omissions artifically inflated
the price of the Xcor stock.
The Kennedy court perceived development of the fraud-on-themarket theory along two lines. On the one hand was Shores, oddly
viewed as a "limited version" of the theory, upholding an action under
"
Rule lOb-5 "only if the securities were proved entirely unmarketable ...
by reason of the fraudulent misrepresentations.' 7 On the other hand was
the "broader version" of the theory, in place in the Second and Ninth
Circuits, which recognized a Rule 10b-5 claim for "any open market purchaser who alleges that defendants inflated the market price."'" The
Kennedy court refused to recognize a claim under either.
Kennedy declined to reject the Panzirer "chain of causation" rationale. Quite the contrary, the case stands as an endorsement of the
principle, properly applied to demonstrate a direct nexus between the
putative violation and the injury of an investor. Where the degree of
proximity between the act and that injury becomes more and more attenuated and the "chain" stretches further and further, however, the
prospect for chance liability grows accordingly, as does the prospect of

"5 A federal district court described causation as "a metaphysical concept and its
meaning may differ in different contexts and the linkage between causation and result
necessary to satisfy the legal concept is not always susceptible of direct proof or.
mathematical determination." Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F.Supp. 66, 98 (E.D.N.Y.
1969), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
36517 F. Supp. 1157 (N.D. Ill.
1981). See also Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F.Supp. 254
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (integrity of market claims as related to class action certification).
" Id. at 1159.
1' Id.
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some independent or intervening force disrupting the essential connection. 39
Although the court couched Panzirerin terms of deficient disclosure
and the relationship between such disclosure and the particular
plaintiff's purchase, the case necessarily stands for the proposition that
the simple existence of a disclosure defect in an open market setting supports assertion of a Rule 10b-5 violation by any buyer or seller of the
security in that market, where a defect taints the integrity of the
market, whether or not the defect had anything to do with the transaction. Like the majority in Shores concluded that the presence of
securities in a marketplace into which they were fraudulently introduced
destroyed the "integrity of the market" without regard to any investor
transaction, Panzireressentially declares that "the market" reflects all
facts and circumstances such that investors carry out any and all transactions in reliance upon its "integrity". What both analyses lack
however, is any definition of market "integrity".
In fairness to the Panzirer analysis, the narrow issue before the
court was the propriety of summary judgment. While the court spoke
broadly of the "integrity of the market" approach to liability, the narrow
issue was whether the record demonstrated "sufficient" connection between the plaintiff's loss and the allegedly fraudulent annual report so
as to withstand the motion. The court further pointed out that the defendants had introduced no evidence to contradict the alleged chain of
causation. There is clearly room here for further consideration of the
"connection" along more traditional and appropriate lines. The Panzirer
court left that door open, and presumably the Supreme Court will pursue it.
VI.

THE FUTURE OF "FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET"

"Fraud-on-the-market" as an approach to the scope of Rule 10b-5
liability was born of pragmatics. In nondisclosure cases it is impossible,
and in most other cases it is impractical, to require individual
demonstration of reliance by each investor in the impersonal open
market. -Initially recognized to allow class action to remedy marketoriented claims, the principle of class-wide causation-in-fact took on
substantive effect in the law. With Affiliated Ute Citizens, causation-infact became engrafted upon the substantive law in open-market situations where courts placed principal focus upon failures to disclose
material information.
None of the courts employing "fraud-on-the-market", however, interpreted it as involvipg something other than fraud in the traditional
sense of a false or. misleading disclosure disseminated in a manner
reasonably calculated to influence the investing public. Ultimate liability

13 Id.
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for nondisclosure, as well as application of a relaxed causation standard,
depended upon the existence of defendants' duty to disclose. The object
of Rule 10b-5 protection being the informed investment decisions of
buyers and sellers of securities, false or misleading information which
artificially raised or depressed the market price for the security was
both logically and necessarily causally connected to transactions at the
artificial price.
The remedial purpose of, and policy underlying, Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 have been offered as broad support for historical expansion of
their coverage. To the extent that courts applied "fraud-on-the-market"
its evolution did not violate fundamental and accepted notions of traditional coverage. It was neither a logical nor insignificant step, however,
to extend coverage under the rubric of the market "integrity", to supplant "fraud", to those situations demonstrating none of the premises on
which "fraud-on-the-market" theory is based. Coverage does not extend
to such situations demonstrating only the existence of a bad act in some
aspect or a scenario in which a securities transaction occurs and an investor suffers loss.
In its post-1975 securities law decisions the Supreme Court has
taught a fundamental lesson concerning the proper role and scope of the
federal securities laws, and the antifraud provisions in particular. These
provisions do not seek to remedy all bad acts associated with securities
transactions; but rather only to assure that investors have accurate information on which to base investment decisions. In circumstances giving rise to a duty of disclosure, investors must be told of all such information, and have the benefit of trading markets free of manipulative influence. The traditional "fraud-on-the-market" theory, based on the artifically maintained or manipulated price of a security in the open
market, is not at all inconsistent with this lesson, if loss causation, as opposed to the more restrictive transaction causation, is the applicable requirement. Fridrichv. Bradford,' Chiarella,and Santa Fe cast doubt on
that assumption. Each of these cases places the broad notions of Affiliated Ute in jeopardy. Even Shores and Panzirerthemselves acknowledged that beyond the pleading stage recovery demands some direct
"chain" of causation.
Certainly, however, the "extension" of the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory to what Shores and Panzirer claim to be "integrity of the
market", which necessarily turns away from a disclosure orientation, is
more than problematic. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 surely prohibit
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative conduct, but such conduct in the
open market setting is manifested in an affected market price of the subject security. This impact serves as the common causal thread upon
which the beads of all investors in that market are strung. Without the
impact there is no premise for "fraud-on-the-market."
"1 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976); see text accompanying note 115 supra.
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Market "integrity" is a notion not susceptible of useful definition or
limitation, although Santa Fe mandates that it involve deception if addressed within the parameters of Rule 10b-5. Panzirermade the attempt
by reaching back to the decision of the Second Circuit in Competitive
Associates, Inc. v. Laventho Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath..' for the
proposition that the plaintiff established causation in fact in circumstances involving "collateral conduct". Coret'tive Associates in-

deed reversed summary judgment for defendants

here plaintiffs' claim-

ed that a "comprehensive scheme to defraud" resulted, or at least was
appropriately linked to, an ultimate securities transaction. The Second
Circuit considered substantial collateral conduct which involved
misrepresentations and omissions as demonstrating a sufficient link
with the subject transaction. The case was not founded on "fraud-on-themarket" theory, however, and though it established a conduct orientation, the validity of its contemporary invocation to support a general notion of market integrity is doubtful.
In Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp.'4 2 for example, plaintiffs
asserted claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 arising out of the purchase of shares of stock in the defendant corporation. Plaintiffs brought
and tried the case as a class action, and alleged that misrepresentations
and omissions in the corporation's annual report artificially inflated the
market price of the stock above its true value. Defendants established
that the named plaintiffs failed to rely upon the allegedly deficient annual report, and indeed the record revealed no direct evidence that any
member of the class relied on it in purchasing the stock. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants perpetrated a fraud on the market. Upon c6nsideration of the evidence at trial, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate a causal link between the alleged disclosure defects and the
economic loss. The court further concluded, on the basis of Competitive
Associates, that defendants engaged in no "comprehensive scheme to
defraud". Interestingly, the court based the latter conclusion upon the
finding that defendants engaged in no common scheme to manipulate the
value of the stock. As a result, plaintiffs could not demonstrate an essen4 3
tial element of the fraud-on-the-market theory.1
The market price of a security is both logically and necessarily the
focal point of fraud-on-the-market theory, and Beissingerwell illustrates
4
1
14

See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 98,613 at 93,024 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Id. at 93,036. The prominence of causation as an essential element of any § 10(b)

and Rule 10b-5 claim continues. See Coons v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,685, at 93,421 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), where causation was viewed as an element of
materiality under § 10(b) and claims were dismissed for failure to link the alleged deception
with plaintiffs' decision to sell their stock. See also Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Standard
Metal Corp., 14 SEc. REG. & LAW REP. (BNA) 1246 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (fraud-on-the-market
theory could not support antifraud claims where plaintiff was aware of misrepresentations
that were said to have affected market price of the securities).
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that recognition. Panzireritself abounds with references to market price
impact while eschewing any particular concern for it. The ultimate
justification offered for the holding in Panzirer was that "an investor
relies generally on the supposition that the market price is validly set
and that no unsuspected fraud has affected the price."'
But Shores v. Sklar stands on quite a different footing. Unabashedly
rationalized on policy grounds-the so-called "paramount goals" of the
federal securities laws to protect investors and promote free and
honest markets- the majority .opinion simply decries bad conduct."' The
defendants may well have fraudulently created the securities, and
authorized and introduced them into the market under those circumstances. But "integrity of the market", if it has sensible and predictable application as a theory of Rule 10b-5 liability, is not a function of
the presence of good or bad securities any more than it is the function of
whether good or bad people sell them. A market is impacted by proscribed fraud or manipulation, and thus denigrated, when the investors carry
out transactions occurring in the market at artifical prices. The federal
securities laws, and Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in particular, indeed
reach "complex fraudulent schemes", as envisioned by the Shores majority. Without impact on the investment decision, however, reprehensible conduct does not rise to the level of fraud for purposes of the Rule.
The Supreme Court cautioned that proper application of the antifraud provisions mandates careful attention to more than whether or not
bad conduct occurred. The existence of deception or traditional market
manipulation, the existence of defined duties relating to disclosure, the
relationship between proscribed conduct and a would-be plaintiff, as to
whether plaintiff can assert a claim in the first place, are all matters of
great emergent importance. The most recent admonition of the Court
that the Court is satisfied that Congress did not enact the securities
laws intending to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud 4 " must
guide substantive applications. Though fraud may be infinite, the scope
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is not.
The role of causation in Rule 10b-5 liability analysis has been
described in many ways. The essence of the principle is that a plaintiff in
such an action should not be entitled to recover damages when the alleged wrongful conduct had no relationship to the claimed harm. Panzirer
...[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,333, at 92,057. The socalled efficient market hypothesis has always presumed that the market price of a security
is a reflection of all representations concerning the stock. See, e.g., In re LTV Securities
Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
,, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,033, at 91,335.
14 See Marine Bank v. Weaver, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,471, at 92,764; 92,766 (U.S. 1982). The issue before the Weaver court was whether a certificate of deposit issued by a federally regulated bank was a "security" under the Securities
Exchange Act, and in particular, under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The court held that it was
not.
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spoke of a chain of causation and expressly recognized that ultimate
recovery in that case would depend upon proof of the chain. The sense of
the decision suggests that the chain ultimately shown would not be unduly attenuated. Were the chain analogy applied in Shores, however, it
is plain that the chain is not a chain at all. Rather, it is but a naked link.
Under the theory of Shores the simple presence of the security supplies
the sufficient link to the transaction at issue. There is no sense of the
decision similar to Panzirer, for the Shores majority specifically
disavowed any notion that ultimate considerations would focus on a
price-directed impact in the market.
Properly applied, the "fraud-on-the-market" theory performs a
useful and important role in achieving the protective purposes of the antifraud provisions. But as transformed into "integrity of the market" in
both Shores and Panzirer,it does not achieve these purposes. Whether
such delineation comes through imposition of a traditional reliance requirement or a less restrictive notion of causation in fact, Rule 10b-5 requires some direct and meaningful linkage between a violative act and
the investment decision of a plaintiff. It does not serve the protective
purposes of the antifraud provisions to endorse their open-ended application without regard to the object of protection -an investment decision.
If particular securities are "fraudulently" created and introduced into a
marketplace, and if individuals whose investment decisions are in no
way linked to alleged deception or informational deficiency ultimately
purchase the securities in that marketplace, the result may be substantial losses and prompt legitimate concerns for an available remedy. Such
concerns alone, however, neither compel nor justify extension of the implied private remedy under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 where the plaintiff fails to demonstrate that an investment decision is linked to the
putative violation.
The majority in Shores rationalizes the decision on the proposition
that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 assure "full disclosure" as only one
means of achieving broader purposes of investor protection and market
integrity. Disregarding the investment decision which serves as a
specific object of protection and the basis for the private right of action,
the broad proposition of Shores is sound, and may well serve as the basis
for some regulatory action. As articulated by the Sixth Circuit in
Fridrichv. Bradford, however, the question remains whether any civil
14 7
remedy extends as far as the remedy available to the SEC.
The private remedy implied under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must
be susceptible of rational limitation. The focus upon an investment decision and the role of an alleged violative act vis-a-vis that decision assures
such a limitation. Panzirerat least recognized the necessity of a "chain
of causation", however attenuated it might be. Shores does not even

"1 542 F.2d at 320.
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acknowledge the point, and in failing to do so turns attention entirely to
the inquiry into whether someone did "something bad."
The "fraud-on-the-market" theory was born of practical necessity
into a world decidedly more hospitable to expansionist views of the
scope of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Although courts no longer favor
such views, the practical necessity for recognizing the special aspects of
the open market as related to the assertion of antifraud claims is not
lessened. The validity of the fundamental proposition of a "fraud-on-themarket" remains. Fraud must be demonstrated, however, and that fraud
must be linked to the investment decisions of investors in the open
market. Without question, Shores v. Sklar rejects this essential element.
Panzirerv. Wolf, though paying lip service, practically ignores it as well,
and fails to further any protective purpose of the antifraud provisions in
the process. Courts must guide future applications of the theory accordingly.

